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Abstract 
The central governments of China have historically always been remote, and largely 
uninvolved in the lives of ordinary citizens, and even in the People's Republic of China, 
"heaven is high, and the emperor far away". Local officials, and their personal 'convictions' 
have often disregarded communications from the central government, and superseded 
national guidelines, regulations, or even laws, leading to local inequalities, the potential for 
corruption, etc. 
 The explosive growth of the number of Internet users in China, and the relative 
freedom enjoyed by these Chinese netizens (interNET + citIZENS) has led to many 
complaints against local officials online. Netizens have convicted local officials of fraud and 
corruption online, attacked them over public misbehavior, criticized them for specific 
remarks, scrutinized criminal investigations, etc. 
 Instead of silencing the online critics of party members and government officials, 
though, the central government appears to welcome their criticism, and is willing to act upon 
evidence supplied by netizens online. In marked contrast to the treatment of offline protest 
actions and dissidents, online dissent has been accepted by the highest levels of the PRC 
government, with even Hu Jintao inviting critical comments online. 
 In a government White Paper, published in June 2010, the central government 
formally approved of the Internet as an appropriate channel of communication between 
ordinary citizens and the highest levels of government. As this paper will demonstrate, this 
attitude of the central government towards the Internet could be seen as a new form of social 
contract between the government and the governed in the People's Republic of China that 
provides for direct channels of communication between the central government and ordinary 
citizens as a way of ensuring good governance at the local level through the officially 
accepted supervision of local officials by active citizens – 'active Citizenship' replacing the 
unenforceable 'rule of law'. 
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In early 2011, China's online population has grown to over 457 million netizens (Internet + 
citizens), or 34% of the People's Republic of China's total population, which can be seen as 
one part of China's amazing development since 1978, and its resultant rise in the level of 
living standards of most segments of the population. The Internet has become very important 
across all levels of Chinese society, from disadvantaged migrant workers who access the 
Internet at a local Internet Cafe or on their mobile phones to network with other migrants in 
the search for jobs, to highly paid managers in international joint-venture companies, who 
communicate with others online, shop online, book their holidays online, etc. The Spring 
Festival Gala of 2011 demonstrated this importance with its inclusion of a number of the 
most popular Internet phrases of 2010 in the sketches that were performed, and by featuring 
two acts who had become famous online, and had been chosen for the Gala through a survey 
of Chinese netizens. 
 Apart from its importance as entertainment, employment, purchasing, etc. platform, 
this paper wants to demonstrate that the internetisation of Chinese society has also brought 
about a new politicalisation of Chinese people – albeit under a very apolitical guise. Chinese 
netizens are getting involved in political action, and are doing so at the invitation and with the 
apparent blessing of the central government who is encouraging netizens to contribute to the 
supervision and control of local government officials. 
 Offline public protest is normally suppressed in China (e.g. Xiao, 2009), dissidents are 
arrested or confined to their place of abode (e.g. Kahn, 2007), and negative news reports are 
censored (e.g. O'Brien, 2009). Despite occasional demonstrations of a willingness to reform 
China (e.g. Buxi, 2008), public criticism of Chinese government institutions by organised 
groups of citizens is still not acceptable in 2011. 
 Online, the situation is often described in similar terms in the academic literature, 
although individual netizens are thought to be in a better position to counter moves by 
government officials to curtail their protests. Chinese netizens are shown circumventing 
restrictions of the government (e.g. Chase and Mulvenon, 2002; Giese, 2006; Hachigian, 
2001; MacKinnon, 2008), while the relationship between government and netizens is often 
portrayed as being more equal than in offline China, i.e. online, netizens can compete with 
the government, or 'contest' its power (e.g. Yang, 2008; 2009), while private Internet 
companies are caught between the two contending forces, at times enabling protest by 
netizens, at times being co-opted by the Chinese government (e.g. Goldsmith and Wu, 2006; 
MacKinnon, 2009a). 
 This paper will argue, though, that the contention between government and netizens 
online is not quite the issue it is made out to be. While local officials are wary of the Internet, 
and have at times attempted to prevent the discussion of local issues online, the central 
authorities appear to intend to use the Internet to keep local and provincial authorities in line. 
Despite nation-wide campaigns against certain types of online content, and a strict censorship 
of many political topics, the central government has repeatedly issued statements encouraging 
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online criticism of local officials and the discussion of local problems (see also Herold, 
2011a). 
 Hu Jintao's succession of Jiang Zemin as President of the People's Republic of China 
and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party brought with it a government-
sanctioned revival of Confucian ideas and of the veneration of Confucius (e.g. Chang, 2011; 
Sisci, 2011), in particular in the form of an increased emphasis on the Confucian ideal of the 
'harmonious society'. Amidst the societal upheavals and the increasing levels of corruption in 
China's state apparatus, the declared goal of the central government became to 'forge an ever 
closer relationship between the people and the government', while promoting 'stability and 
unity' (Xinhua New Agency, 2005). 
 As part of these efforts, in 2008, Hu Jintao engaged netizens in a brief, but highly 
symbolic, online chat (see e.g. Mu, 2008a for a video clip and an English summary, also for 
the quotes below), which was pre-scripted and meant to set the tone for the government's 
engagement with netizens. Hu Jintao 'said the Internet is an important source of news', 
referring to Chinese and international news sources, thereby officially condoning the access 
of foreign news sites by Chinese netizens. Additionally, he stated the internet was 'a channel 
where the president can find out what netizens' concerns are, and a way to gather their 
opinions', which constituted an invitation for netizens to use online forums, in particular the 
People's Daily Strong Country Forum, which hosted the online chat, to air their grievances so 
that they would be noticed (and could be acted upon) by China's central government. Chinese 
Premier Wen Jiabao followed this up by engaging Chinese netizens in online chats in 2009 
and 2010 (e.g. Wu, & Dean, 2010). 
 Chinese netizens appear to have responded to the encouragements by the Chinese 
government, and have used the Internet to investigate, supervise, attack, and punish local 
officials and Party members whose conduct they found unacceptable. The next part of this 
paper will discuss a few selected example cases in which local officials were held to account 
by Chinese netizens, which will be followed by a closer look at statements made by China's 
central government about the role, the function, and the rights of netizens vis-à-vis the 
supervision of local officials. The paper will conclude that a new form of political contract is 
emerging in China between the central government and the citizens of China that promotes 
citizen activism online as a form of 'checks and balances' for local officials who have proved 
hard to control for the centre throughout China's history. This allows the central government 
to exert more control over local officials, while the citizens of China gain the right to 
supervise the government at the local level and have their complaints heard and acted upon. It 
permits government and citizens to engage in political interactions aimed at improving the 
governance of the People's Republic of China, while ostensibly focusing on solving apolitical, 
local problems. 
1. ONLINE POLITICAL ACTION 
Over the past few years, numerous government officials have been attacked online by 
netizens for a variety of transgressions, which included corruption, collusion with criminals, 
crimes, etc. The result of these online campaigns against targeted officials has often been the 
dismissal of the officials from both their position and from the Chinese Communist Party, 
which has not escaped the attention of China's large online population (see also Herold, 
2011b). 
 One such case in 2007 started with the posting of an open letter signed by 400 
desperate fathers on several online message boards. The fathers' letter stated that their 
children had been missing for some time and had probably been kidnapped, but that the 
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authorities were refusing to help the parents find their children. The response by netizens was 
enormous, and within a few days, numerous children had been found, working as virtual 
slaves in small brick-making factories throughout Henan province. The online furore was 
noticed by foreign media organisations, and shortly after their reports (e.g. Watts, 2007; 
Associated Press, 2007), the central government sent special police forces into the area from 
Beijing who freed thousands of young Chinese and arrested hundreds of owners of brick-
making factories, and officials and local police who were found to have colluded with them. 
The information collected by netizens had managed to avoid local censorship and reached the 
central government, who then cracked down on the criminal behaviour of local officials 
based on the evidence provided by netizens. 
 In a much smaller case in 2008, a video clip was uploaded to sites across the Chinese 
internet that showed how a drunk man walked towards the toilets in the company of a little 
girl. The accompanying text claimed that the man in the video had attempted to molest the 11 
year old girl sexually, but that she had run away and gone back to her parents (Fauna, 2008). 
Her parents attempted to confront the man, who proceeded to shout at them and the restaurant 
staff, claiming to be a high ranking official from Beijing. He demanded to be treated with 
respect, but admitted to having molested the child, and offered the parents some money (Tang, 
2008). The parents called the police who allowed the 'Beijing official' to leave the restaurant 
shortly after their arrival, while admonishing the parents to forget about the incident. 
 Shortly afterwards, someone uploaded the video footage from a surveillance camera 
inside the restaurant to several Chinese video sharing sites, and the story managed to grab the 
attention of netizens from across China. A frame-by-frame analysis of the video and the 
combing of official photo archives by thousands of netizens quickly led to the identification 
of the 'Beijing official'. The man's name was published online as Lin Jiaxiang, who was the 
Communist Party secretary for the Shenzhen Marine Office. Ironically, the photo that led to 
his identification showed him receiving an award for his services to the people, which had 
been posted online. Lin Jiaxiang's contact details, including his official address and telephone 
numbers, as well as his personal mobile number were published online, together with the 
details of how to get into contact with the Marine Administrations Disciplinary Inspection 
Office (Fauna, 2008) and large numbers of netizens used the information to complain about 
him and to accuse him of attempted rape of an 11-year old child. 
 The central party committee of the Ministry of Transport in Beijing decided to step in 
very fast, and announced that Lin Jiaxiang had been relieved of all his duties, and stripped of 
his party membership for embarrassing the Chinese Communist Party (Chen, H., 2008a). The 
police investigation ended without any concrete results, though, and he was cleared of all 
criminal charges due to a lack of conclusive evidence against him (Chen, H., 2008b). In legal 
terms this means that Lin Jiaxiang was punished not for (alleged) attempted rape, but for 
causing and embarrassment for the party with China's netizens, i.e. he was punished for 
causing a storm online. 
 Another official who aroused the anger of China's online population in 2008, was the 
Nanjing housing department director Zhou Jiugeng, who gave an interview during which he 
not only defended the high property prices in Nanjing, but also indicated that they were too 
low and should rise further. When a recording of the interview was uploaded to several video 
sharing sites, it immediately began to spread through Chinese cyberspace (Soong, 2008a). 
Angry netizens began to analyse the video clip from the interview, and pointed out that both 
the cigarettes Zhou Jiugeng was smoking, as well as the watch he was wearing were far 
beyond the means of an official on the government's payroll. A dossier was compiled online 
and then forwarded to the Nanjing housing department, who used the materials to relieve 
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Zhou Jiugeng of his duties (Mu, 2008b), before issuing a statement correcting his comments 
from the interview (Soong, 2008b). After a trial lasting ten months, in 2009 Zhou Jiugeng 
was sentenced to eleven years in prison (Macartney, 2009b). The netizens had won. 
 In 2009, a case involving the sexual misconduct of Party members was even widely 
reported by news organisations in Europe and America (e.g. Branigan, 2009; Canaves, 2009b; 
Macartney, 2009a), and resulted in an article on Wikipedia (2009). A young woman called 
the police to give herself up, after killing a government official and wounding another one at 
a foot massage centre in Hubei. She was arrested and charged with homicide, and the 
outcome of the case seemed to be a foregone conclusion, until details of the case were posted 
online and managed to attract the attention of large numbers of netizens. Following their 
investigations, it emerged that Deng Yujiao, the young woman, had been assaulted by the 
officials after refusing to have sex with them for money. The officials had attempted to force 
her down on a sofa, ripped open her clothes, and tried to rape her, when she managed to get 
hold of a small fruit knife, which she used against her attackers, killing one, and wounding 
the other. Outrage over the case spread online and the number of netizens involved grew 
dramatically, which led to the police re-opening the case to conduct another investigation 
(Soong, 2009a; 2009b). The publicity resulted in proper representation for Deng Yujiao by 
several lawyers from Beijing who took on her case pro-bono (Martinsen, 2009a), and online 
China followed the case with continuous posts on discussion forums across the Chinese 
internet (Chen, B., 2009). The verdict of the court concluded that Deng Yujiao had used 
excessive force in defending herself, but the judges decided to release her on the grounds that 
she was allegedly mentally impaired (Martinsen, 2009b). This means, she was declared guilty, 
but let go anyway, while the officials involved were punished by the Communist Party 
Discipline Inspection Committee with expulsion from the Party, demotion, termination of 
employment, and in one case with an arrest for committing offences against the public order. 
Both the non-Chinese media, as well as Chinese netizens celebrated the outcome as a huge 
victory of netizens against criminal local officials, while the Chinese government could point 
to their responsiveness to the wishes of the people. 
 In September 2010, three members of a family in Jiangxi tried to prevent the forced 
eviction of their family from their home by local government officials and property 
developers by setting themselves on fire. One died, and the other two were taken to a hospital, 
from which the local officials removed the body of the deceased. Two of the daughters of the 
family then attempted to fly to Beijing to complain to the central government's petition office, 
but were prevented from boarding their flights by the local county's Party secretary and his 
henchmen. The two women managed to phone a reporter who posted updates of their story to 
his microblog on Sina.com, whose Weibo service is very similar to the American Twitter, 
which resulted in the sisters being able to leave the airport under the protection of reporters 
alerted to the developing story. One of the sisters, Zhong Rujiu, then decided that Sina's 
Weibo promised to be more effective than continuing to attempt to file an official complaint, 
and began posting updates to an account she established for this purpose (Soong, 2010). 
Despite continuing attempts to delete the posted information, her updates were read and 
reposted by rapidly increasing numbers of Chinese netizens, and by national media outlets, 
which led to the central government intervening in the case (Fang, & Lin, 2010; Zhao, 2010). 
By the time, online attention moved on, four officials had been removed from their posts, 
eight further officials were still under investigation, and the Zhong family had received a 
large compensation from the government (Colwell, 2010). Again, online attention had 
circumvented local attempts to suppress information and led to direct action by the central 
government to punish local officials for illegal activities. 
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 A final, quite curious incident that demonstrates the speed and power of Chinese 
netizens, as well as the government's reluctance to interfere, happened in December 2010. 
Fang Binxing, the president of the Beijing University for Posts and Telecommunications, 
decided to open an account on the Sina Weibo microblogging site. His claim to fame in 
China is that he is seen as the 'father of the Great Firewall', i.e. the person behind the 
development of the Chinese government's censorship and surveillance technology for the 
internet. Shortly after he posted his second comment to his microblog, it was spotted by other 
microbloggers who spread the news about his posts on their own microblogs, and on many 
other sites and forums. This resulted in a flood of negative comments, attacking Fang Binxing 
that were posted faster than they could be deleted by Sina.com's moderators, and just over 
three hours after he had created his account, Fang Binxing's Sina Weibo account was closed 
down and deleted – with all the comments it had and still was attracting (Xiao, 2010). China's 
netizens had forced his unwanted presence off the internet. 
 While many more examples could be presented here, the cases mentioned above all 
demonstrate certain common features, which suffice as illustration of the argument presented 
here. In all of the cases (except for Fang Binxing's), local officials had become involved in 
corrupt and/or criminal activities, and local people were unable to obtain justice from them. A 
presentation of their cases on the Chinese Internet, or in Fang Binxing's case the spreading of 
news about his presence on Sina Weibo, led to a rapid mobilisation of thousands, if not 
millions of Chinese netizens, who began posting comments online, attacking the local 
officials, and complaining about their behaviour. The growing disturbances online caught the 
attention of central authorities, who then proceeded to intervene in the situation by 
investigating and disciplining the guilty local official, after which the internet agitation 
quieted down, while netizens celebrated another victory over local corruption, and praised the 
central government for helping ordinary citizens. Both netizens and the central government 
emerge as winners from these incidents, while the individual local officials (and Fan Binxing) 
are seen to be 'justly' punished. Local officials are given notice that misbehaviour will no 
longer be tolerated, while the connection between the central government and the citizens of 
China grows stronger. 
2. (CENTRAL) GOVERNMENT AND NETIZEN SUPERVISION 
Looking at the protests from the opposite side, it soon becomes apparent that the central 
government is not only suffering these online protests to exist, but actively encourages the 
supervision of local officials by Chinese netizens. While offline protests are still curtailed by 
the police, online protests are allowed to proceed. 
 In 2009 and 2010 the Chinese central government demonstrated in a very unequivocal 
manner that activities on the Chinese internet happened with their tacit approval, and that 
they were in a position to crush all online opposition if they so chose. The Muslim Uighur 
riots during the summer of 2009 led to a decision by the Chinese government to shut down 
the internet for the entire Xinjiang province. In December 2009, they then directed several 
Chinese internet companies to create a miniature Internet, consisting of 20 websites that was 
made available to the people of Xinjiang. When the province remained quiet, 'normal' internet 
access was restored in May 2010 (Heacock, 2009; Lewis, 2010; Mudie, 2010; Summers, 
2009). 
 This unchallenged interference with internet access for an entire province proved that 
the Chinese authorities have both the technological capabilities, as well as the political will to 
shape the internet as they see fit. Even private internet companies were willing to be co-opted 
into service along strict government guidelines. The level of control over the internet in 
China this exercise demonstrated underlines the contention stated above that everything that 
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happens on the Chinese internet does have at the very least the central government's tacit 
approval. 
 In statements made in 2009, government spokespeople went a lot further, though, in 
explicitly lauding and encouraging online efforts to supervise local officials and to attack 
corruption and crime. The Vice Minister of Supervision, the central government's lead figure 
in the fight against corruption, Hao Mingjin remarked in an interview that his office took tips 
from the internet very seriously. In a similar interview the head of the General Administration 
of Press and Publication (GAPP), Liu Binjie went even further: 
'Internet supervision is playing a very important role in promoting democracy and 
ensuring the people's right to know, which should be fully encouraged and supported'. 
(Xinhua News Agency, 2009) 
Steven Dong, an adviser speaking for the State Council, underlined these sentiments in an 
interview with the foreign press, by emphasising that the 
'Internet has become the most powerful media in every government official's daily life 
[…]. Last year [= 2008], we had over 84 government officials who were (affected by 
cyber-vigilantism) and one third of them lost their jobs'. 
(Agence France Presse, 2009) 
These statements are remarkable in that they create an interesting re-interpretation of the 
concept of democracy. Western notions of democracy argue for the election of 
representatives by the population of a country who are then expected to govern on behalf of 
their voters. By contrast, the 'people power' alluded to in statements by the central 
government representatives seems to consist more of an increased accountability of 
especially local officials to the people they are governing on behalf of the Chinese 
Communist Party and the central government of the People's Republic of China. Put 
differently, 
'the Internet is introducing a new measure of public accountability and civic action 
into China's […] political system. […] For the moment, the central government in 
Beijing appears to be allowing Internet protests to continue, and in some instances 
even encouraging them -- as long as the campaigns are confined to local issues and 
target local officials.' 
(Richburg, 2009) 
According to these statements, and several other publications by the central government, 
Chinese officials are expected to pay attention to Chinese netizens, their concerns and 
grievances, and are punished, if netizens begin complaining about them in large numbers 
(Chen, J., 2009; Canaves, 2009a; Liu, 2009). While Heaven is still high in China, and the 
emperors of Zhongnanhai are still far away, it seems as if China's rulers have decided to 
employ ordinary citizens to ensure the compliance of local officials with Beijing directives, 
and they have done so with a remarkable degree of success: 
'If the Communist Party manages things well, they may stay in power longer if they 
use the Internet than they would if the Internet didn't exist'. 
(Fletcher, 2009) 
In June 2010, the Chinese government went beyond statements of individual officials, and 
published a White Paper on the future of the Chinese Internet, which spelled out the role of 
the internet and of Chinese netizens in supervising local officials and solving local problems. 
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The Paper argued for the internet's importance by pointing to its contribution in three areas, 
namely the 'development of the national economy', the need to 'meet people's increasing 
demands for information', and the creation of an 'e-government while enhancing the 
capability of governance', calling the internet 'an important infrastructure facility for the 
nation'. (Information Office …, 2010). 
 While the Paper emphasises the economic importance of the Internet, calling it vital to 
China's development, as it had an 'irreplaceable role in accelerating the development of the 
national economy', a large part of the White Paper focuses on the exchange of information 
between netizens, and their right to use such information exchanges to supervise government 
officials. The Paper asserts that Chinese people have 'increasing demands for information', 
which officials should not ignore, and which are supposed to be met 'government at all levels', 
so as to answer the 'people's right to know', as 'the Internet has become an important channel 
for people to obtain news' (Ibid.). 
'In China more and more people are collecting information, enriching their knowledge, 
establishing businesses and realizing their aspirations, and communicating to know 
each other better through the Internet. Soon after earthquakes hit Wenchuan in 
Sichuan Province and Yushu in Qinghai Province, and a severe drought plagued 
southwest China, netizens used the Internet to spread disaster relief information, 
initiate rescue efforts and express sympathy and concern, fully demonstrating the 
irreplaceable role of the Internet. The Internet has revolutionized our way of work and 
lifestyle.' 
(Ibid.) 
The White Paper also formally outlined the duty of officials at all levels of the state to 'give 
prompt explanations to issues of public concern', i.e. questions raised on the Chinese internet 
about events offline should be answered promptly by local officials. The stated goal is that 
'the Internet's role in supervision is given full play', a goal that in early 2011 was pursued to 
almost ridiculous levels when repeated online doubts about the police handling of a 
suspicious traffic accident in Zhejiang led to numerous investigations by a succession of 
independent committees chosen by Chinese netizens, who were given access to police reports 
and local witnesses and who reported their findings online (see the collection of stories 
translated and collated by Soong, 2011). According to the White Paper, the Chinese state 
requires 'governments at all levels to […] give prompt explanations to issues of public 
concern', so that 'the Internet's role in supervision is given full play' (Information Office …, 
2010). 
'The Chinese government has actively created conditions for the people to supervise 
the government, and attaches great importance to the Internet's role in supervision. 
Governments at all levels are required to investigate and resolve in a timely manner 
all problems reported to the government by the public via the Internet, and to inform 
the public of the results.' 
(Ibid.) 
This supervision of government officials by the people, in particular by Chinese netizens, 
through direct communication between the people and top people in China's central 
government is a very innovative approach in politics. Even more so as this engagement with 
citizens is not just the informal twittering or blogging of a presidential contender or president, 
but a formal announcement in and framed by an official policy document on the future of the 
Internet as seen by the government of the People's Republic of China. MacKinnon (2010) is 
probably right when she says about the Chinese government that 'the regime actually uses the 
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Internet not only to extend its control but also to enhance its legitimacy', rather than 
attempting to solve some of the problems caused by China's existing legal and political 
system. Nevertheless, the past few years have shown that the central government is serious in 
its desire to engage Chinese netizens in a direct dialogue aimed at solving local problems and 
supervising local officials. 
'The authorities attach great importance to […] public opinion as reflected on the 
Internet, which has become a bridge facilitating direct communication between the 
government and the public. […] The opinions expressed by the public online are 
receiving unprecedented attention. The leaders of China frequently log onto the 
Internet to get to know the public's wishes, and sometimes have direct online 
communication with netizens to discuss state affairs and answer their questions. It has 
become a common practice for governments at all levels to consult the public via the 
Internet before formulating policies of particular importance. The public's opinions 
have been sought through the Internet during the annual sessions of the NPC and 
CPPCC. For each of the past three years, as many as several million items of advice 
and suggestions have been received through the Internet, providing valuable reference 
for the government to improve its work.' 
(Information Office …, 2010) 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
In European and American political thinking good governance is usually equated with a 
system of interlocking, but independent institutions providing checks and balances for each 
other, that is connected to the citizens of a country through well-defined and strictly applied 
laws, i.e. 'the rule of law' (see e.g. Berg-Schlosser, 2004; Bouckaert, & van de Walle, 2003). 
In China, by contrast, such a system is currently not in place, nor will it be for the foreseeable 
future. Neither are political institutions independent from each other, nor do different 
institutions have the right to supervise each other, while the rule of law simply does not exist 
in China, where the breaking or circumventing of laws is still regarded as a socially 
acceptable status symbol for the rich and/or well-connected. 
 'Good governance' in the Chinese context means contributing to the creation of a 
'harmonious society', both in the Confucian sense, as well as in current political usage, and 
not necessarily the introduction of a democracy patterned on Euro-American political 
philosophies (Chu, & Cheng, 2011; Ott, 2010). The Chinese central government appears to 
be interested in the creation of what Rebecca MacKinnon calls a 'cybertarian' system of 
government (MacKinnon, 2009b) that combines an offline authoritarian style of government 
with some form of permitted or encouraged online feedback, which provides individual 
citizens with a sense of freedom online, as their concerns are being heard, and even 
responded to, while offline restrictions on their freedom become more acceptable. 
 The channelling of existing feelings of aggression, frustrations, anger, betrayal, 
helplessness, etc. of ordinary citizens into the online participation in governance of active 
citizens constitutes a huge achievement for the Chinese government, if it is successful, and 
will certainly contribute to the longevity of the current system of government in China. Nor 
should the efforts of the Chinese government be denigrated as mere window dressing for 
propaganda purposes. Real officials have received real punishments based on the efforts of 
active netizens. While corruption and officially condoned crime have become near endemic 
in China, the blame for which lies squarely with the Chinese Communist Party, it is naive to 
assume that a Euro-American rule of law and a democratic system could be established in 
China through either revolutionary or government-directed change within the near future. 
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 The on-going experimentations with new forms of governance by the Chinese 
leadership, in an attempt both to hold on to their power, as well as to discover a genuinely 
Chinese alternative to Euro-American forms of governance, deserves a lot of respect, and 
should be analysed carefully. Parliamentary democracy as it has evolved in European and 
American countries is based on the curious mixture of the philosophical ideas of ancient 
Greek and Roman thinkers with Judaeo-Christian religious thinking. To assume that it is the 
best possible form of governance for human societies constitutes both ethnocentrism, as well 
as arrogance. 
 Citizens throughout Europe and America have been growing increasingly apathetic 
during the past 30 years. People feel that their concerns are ignored by politicians and that 
their political power has been reduced to the casting of meaningless votes in periodically held 
elections contested by dishonest politicians, whose promises are indistinguishable from each 
other. Recent political events that involved 'the people', like the emergence of the Tea Party 
in the USA, the protests against a rise in study-fees in the UK, or against the raising of the 
retirement age in France, or against the construction of a massive, underground railway 
station in Germany, have mostly served to demonstrate the contempt politicians feel for 
ordinary citizens and their opinions. 
 By contrast, the central government of the People's Republic of China has repeatedly 
stated that they are interested in the opinions of ordinary citizens, if their opinions are aired 
online, and have proved their interest by acting on complaints they received from netizens. 
Active netizens are encouraged by the Chinese government to contribute to the good 
governance of China – in a very restricted and prescribed manner, but in a form not available 
to the citizens of other countries. It is going to be interesting to see how this very Chinese 
system of good governance continues to develop. 
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